Within these pages you will find official government documentation that lead to the inescapable conclusion that Prisoners of War were left behind at the end of World War II, Korea, the Cold War, Vietnam and the Gulf War. A conclusion confirmed Feb. 11th 2005, by the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD,) the investigative arm of the U.S/Russian Joint Commission. In the 5th revision of their Gulag Study, they confirm "Americans, including American servicemen, were imprisoned in the former Soviet Union...."
During a CNN interview, when asked about the number of American's held, JCSD executive secretary Norman Kass responded; "I personally would be comfortable saying that the number is in the hundreds."
Today, we have two servicemen, Ahmed Altaie, listed as Missing/Captured and held somewhere in Iraq as a result of action in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Scott Speicher captured during Operation Desert Storm. To find out why these servicemen and any that come after them are not listed as Prisoner of War visit our Call to Action Section.
"The U.S. Should not be surprised, particularly in light of Japanese and German experiences with the Soviets in World War II , if a number of completely unrecorded Americans are ultimately found to be alive or to have been alive and in Communist hands..." so states a memo for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, dated September 16, 1955.
Were POWs from World War II, Korea and the Cold War taken into the Former Soviet Union and China?
Read the "Transfer of US Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union" prepared by Task Force Russia, in 1992. Follow that with a reading of the 2002 Gulag Study prepared by the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD), the investigative arm of the U.S./Russian Joint Commission.
Where is Roger Dumas? Last seen August 24th, 1953, according to returned POW, Ciro J. Santo: "...He was to be repatriated on the same day I was, on August 25th. The Chinese took those guys away. But we don't know where they took 'em...."
"...He was taken in the last moment, just before they brought him to the Freedom Village bridge, at Panmunjom, just between North and South Korea...."
Where is Richard Desautels ? There are at least 19 statements made by former POWs, reporting Richard Desautels in captivity. By far, the most chilling statement recounts Richard Desautels own fears "...he mentioned if he should disappear to make inquires concerning his whereabouts with the proper military authorities...." In 2005, Chinese officials admitted Desautels was taken to China. Read the reports and more in our Korean/Cold War Section.
"We missed the best chance we ever had to find POWs still alive" said former National Security Advisor Richard Allen
The day before General Tighe wrote his memo, the State Department issued a memo titled "Contingency Plan For Live Americans In Indochina" describing actions to be taken "depending on the country involved, the number of persons held prisoner..."
Read about Project X, a 1976 study "initiated for operational purposes in August 1975 to evaluate the possibility of any of the unaccounted for being alive. The conclusion reached is: There is a possibility that as many as 57 Americans could be alive, although it is highly probable that the number is much smaller...."
Where is Capt. John McDonnell? "Referenced report provided information of urgent political sensitivity," so reads a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) message sent to USDAO SAIGON VIETNAM on June 15, 1973. Only evidence of American POWs left behind in Vietnam would warrant a message of "Urgent Political Sensitivity." That was the situation facing DIA in June of 1973.
Where is Sp4 Tom Mangino, and PFC's Paul Hasenbeck, Danny Nidds and David Winters? Here's what Paul's sister Jeanie has to say about the conclusions of the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) "... I simply cannot comprehend how the rule of "credibility" is applied Without confirmation, it sometimes is creditable and it sometimes is hearsay. Just how does that work? When it doesn't confirm their determination of fate, it becomes hearsay, when it does confirm their determination it is creditable. This is truly an ART as any rule of SCIENCE is thrown out the window...."
She continued; "...Just wanted to pass this DETERMINATION on to you. It truly is an amazing logic they apply - most unique and never experienced anywhere else in my world."
Read about Nhommarath, Project X, McDonnell, Mangino, Hasenbeck, Nidds, Winters and much more in our Vietnam Section.
Here are a few quotes from the various memo's, letters, and notes:
Warren Gray: "I am extremely disappointed regarding many aspects of the POW issue...."
"In November 1993 DPMO received a report that American POWs had been held in SEA after Homecoming, possibly as late as 1976, and that the number was 185. An immediate effort was made to go back to the original source to obtain further information, without success. The report was deemed to be so important and possibly credible that the collection representative was directed to follow the situation and to conduct frequent follow-ups which did not happen."
"In January 1998 members of the Joint Commission Support Directorate (JCSD) within DPMO decided to investigate the report and asked the collection representative for access. The collection representative stated that she had no idea which report they were talking about, therefore could not furnish it."
"Only after JCSD personnel threatened to demand an Inspector General investigation into the loss was the report "found." Later in 1998 JCSD did what it could with limited resources to investigate the report; that was the last action to check out the possible credible information. Details of the report have never been taken to any country within SEA to demand an explanation, perhaps because the implications of the report were that the country in question could never have been deemed to be cooperating in the POW issue if the report was true."
"The same collection representative that received the report in 1993, that lost the report in 1998 and who would have been responsible for any follow-up since its receipt, remains in place, and the report remains unresolved. During the mid-l 990's a Russian geologist was interviewed and reported that he was told in 1976 by Vietnamese counterparts that the Vietnamese Government at that time was holding live American POWs."
From a Fax regarding the Life Science Lab: "The lab is being denied casework. This to me is a serious violation of the trust our families have put into our government to solve these cases...." (Note: this is a reference to the Life Science Lab.)
From the Castle Memo: "Unauthorized Contact With Hanoi: – "in their efforts to ensure that Hanoi's version is accepted, Mr. Destatte and Lt.Col Shiff have engaged in unauthorized contact with the Vietnamese government and Detachment 2, JTF-FA.... "
From Background Paper of I.O. Lee: "There are too many live sighting reports, specifically observations of several Caucasians in a collective farm by Romanians and the North Korean defectors' eyewitness of Americans in DPRK to dismiss that there are no American POW's in North Korea.
From testimony of former member of JTF-FA: "BG Needham.... then explained what he called his "80 percent rule." His philosophy, and consequently that of his new command, was that completing a task quickly with an 80 percent standard of success was preferable to completing it perfectly but taking more time. He emphasized that this rule was to be the guiding principle in all JTF operations, including all field investigations. "
Memo of John McCreary "Obstruction of the Investigation" – "This anticipatory discrediting of a Select Committee potential witness is tantamount to tampering with the evidence.... the Department of Defenses' continuing access to sensitive Committee Staff papers is resulting in obstructions of the investigations by the Senate Select Committee by various agencies of the Executive Branch.
Resignation Letter of Col. Mike Peck – "The mindset to debunk is alive and well....."
Letter of Dr. Samuel Dunlap discussing deficiencies at CIL-HI – "The CID documentation you have undoubtedly seen about CILHI has led myself, my two colleagues, Drs. Lundy and Miller and several stateside forensic scientists to the inescapable conclusion that Lt. Col. Webb, Mr. Helgensen and Mr. Furue are incompetent at best..."